On account of the various forms of elections which some try to invent, there arise many difficulties and great dangers for the bereaved churches. We therefore decree that at the holding of an election, when all are present who ought to, want to and conveniently can take part, three trustworthy persons shall be chosen from the college who will diligently find out, in confidence and individually, the opinions of everybody. After they have committed the result to writing, they shall together quickly announce it. There shall be no further appeal, so that after a scrutiny that person shall be elected upon whom all or the greater or sounder part of the chapter agree. Or else the power of electing shall be committed to some suitable persons who, acting on behalf of everybody, shall provide the bereaved church with a pastor. Otherwise the election made shall not be valid, unless perchance it was made by all together as if by divine inspiration and without flaw. Those who attempt to make an election contrary to the aforesaid forms shall be deprived of the power of electing on that occasion. We absolutely forbid anyone to appoint a proxy in the matter of an election, unless he is absent from the place where he ought to receive the summons and is detained from coming by a lawful impediment. He shall take an oath about this, if necessary, and then he may commit his representation to one of the college, if he so wishes. We also condemn clandestine elections and order that as soon as an election has taken place it should be solemnly published.
Certain laymen try to encroach too far upon divine right when they force ecclesiastics who do not hold any temporalities from them to take oaths of fealty to them. Since a servant stands or falls with his Lord, according to the Apostle, we therefore forbid, on the authority of this sacred council, that such clerics be forced to take an oath of this kind to secular persons.
oath of fealty epub 12
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"Seignors, if You do not believe that this is true, let me climb up into this tower, and I will throw myself down, and if I am unharmed, believe that this is true. If, however, I shall have suffered any hurt, behead me, or cast me into the fire." Then the Bishop of Puy ordered that the Gospel and the Cross be brought, so that be might take oath that this was true.
But here too we must distinguish. It will, I think, readily be conceded to me that an agreement whether freely manifested by or extorted by means of violence or intimidation from the whole people or a majority of them should rather be annulled than observed if it were established beyond doubt that such agreement was clearly incompatible with fairness and honor. For who would persuade himself that some nation would freely, wittingly and unconstrained wish to subject itself to some ruler to this end that it might subsequently be murdered and utterly destroyed by him? But surely here again two (considerations) should be heeded, whenever those undertakings have to be annulled or set right to which agreement has been granted without due consideration: first nothing shall be attempted or done recklessly and, secondly, nothing by way of insurrection, but in due order and in a disciplined fashion as far as shall be possible. The present condition of the Christian Commonwealth furnishes us with two examples of this, both assuredly of the greatest importance. The first is that of the unjust and sinful submissiveness with which kings and nations have bound themselves by oath to the Roman Antichrist; I maintain that they are no more bound by that oath than if they had expressly and openly sworn to Satan that they would subvert all rights of God as well as men. The other example is that of the so-called temporal jurisdiction to which the ecclesiastic prelates have laid claim. Because this is diametrically opposed to the command of Christ as well as to the clearest examples of Him and of all Apostles - as particularly Saint Bernard has shown19 - it assuredly follows that of itself it is void since neither could the rulers divest and deprive themselves of that (jurisdiction), nor could the ecclesiastics receive it from kings or nations or acquire it at a price, much less should they have usurped it by force and cunning tricks as it is certain that they did in far the greater part of the world.
I now come to the lower magistrates who are as it were intermediaries, and as the common people call them, subalterns, between the supreme magistrate and the people. Under this title I do not understand the domestic officers of the King personally (that is those who perform some duty within the royal palace and serve his person rather than the kingdom) but rather those who perform public duties, that is duties pertaining to the condition of the kingdom either as regards its courts of justice or matters of war, and who therefore even in monarchies are styled servants not of the King but of the Crown or Kingdom (for between these there is a highly important difference). Of this kind used to be in Rome, the consuls, the praetors, the city prefect, and the governors of provinces (whose [election] used to be entrusted now to the people itself, and now, in the time of the Emperors, even to the Senate) and similar officials of the Republic or the Empire, who for that reason were called magistrates of the Roman people even under the last Emperors. Such also were among the Israelites the leaders of the several tribes, the leaders of thousands, of hundreds, of fifties, of tens and the elders of the people. These political functions, first regulated by Moses, were in no way afterwards abolished when that aristocratic constitution was transformed into that of a monarchy, nay more, under Solomon they were carefully established and observed. Even today various classes of magistrates of the kind are to be found in most Christian kingdoms, and among them should be counted those who are styled dukes, marquises, counts, viscounts, barons and squires as having formerly been chosen in due order and lawfully to certain public duties and tasks that they might perform them. And though these subsequently became hereditary titles of honor, yet they have in no way lost their original right and authority. Among this class should further be included those who are elected with a view to a variety of duties in civic communities such as those who are generally called majors, vicars, consuls, capitolini (municipal judges), syndics, scabini (aldermen) and the like.
Further, although these are all subject to the supreme magistrate, receive their commands from him and are instituted and approved by him, yet they do not properly speaking depend upon him but so to speak upon the supremacy as such, that is upon that supreme power and authority of the empire or kingdom; hence upon the death of him who wielded the supreme power they each remain in their own station as before, just as the supreme power remains the same. As for the fact that he who succeeds to the place of him who has died confirms such subordinate magistrates as he also confirms the privileges of cities - Suetonius records in (his Life of Vespasian)9 that Tiberius Caesar first introduced this custom in the Roman Empire; and in earlier times it was not in use in Gaul10 except perchance when the kingship passed not from fathers to sons but to strangers - this confirmation I declare, does not bring about that the supreme magistrate should be regarded as their originator, that is, as the prime source of their being from whom they derive their origin, since the supreme magistrate himself also before he can be placed in possession of his highest administrative power, in turn takes the oath to the supreme power in accordance with the conditions expressed in the formula of the oath; just as he himself afterwards receives the oath from the officials severally also; so much so that such a confirmation bestows no new right - as little as the investiture of a vew vassal does so or that performed by a new lord - but it is merely a fresh recognition of an old right by reason of a change of person.
It hence appears that the obligation between the king and the officials of the kingdom is mutual and that not the entire administration of the kingdom is entrusted to the king alone but only the highest rank, and that the subordinate officials severally hold part of it each in accordance with his own rank, and that on fixed conditions on either side. If those conditions are not kept by the subordinate magistrates the supreme magistrate is entitled to discharge them or to correct them, yet only after their case has been heard in accordance with the regular procedure which the laws of the kingdom prescribe, unless he himself also desires to break the oath by which he promised to rule in accordance with the laws.
In the contrary case, however, if he who has received the royal dignity either by being elected thereto or by hereditary right openly departs from those conditions under which he was expressly recognized and approved as king, who would be inclined to doubt that the subordinate magistrates of the kingdom and further the very provinces also and the cities whose administration has been entrusted to them are automatically (ipso iure) free from their oath, in so far at all events that they have right to set themselves against the undisguised oppression of that kingdom whose defense and protection they undertook by oath each in accordance with his own office. "What then?" will someone say, "shall he who but lately was regarded as the supreme ruler (whose authority should be inviolable) - shall he by the arbitrary will of every subordinate now be deemed as mere private citizen so that it shall be lawful to assail him as a public enemy?"
But since on the other hand those subordinate instruments of the kingdom have received this office from the supreme power as such that they may be on their guard for the observance and protection of the laws among those who have been entrusted to their care, and since they have bound themselves by oath to perform that duty in all faith - an oath from which they cannot be absolved by any fault of him who from a king has become a tyrant and quite openly violates those conditions upon which he was appointed king and the observance of which he undertook upon oath - would it not be just according to all law, diving and human, that by reason of the oath taken by them to ensure the observance of the laws, somewhat greater (liberty of action) should be granted to these subordinate magistrates than to those (citizens) who are of entirely private station and without any public office? I therefore maintain that, if they are reduced to such unavoidable compulsion, they are certainly bound, even by means of armed force if they can, to protect against manifest tyranny the safety of those who have been entrusted to their care and honor, as long as their public interests have been better consulted and fittingly provided for in accordance with the collective counsel of the States-General or the Nomophylakes, that is, of those with whom all the legislative authority of the kingdom or empire in question rests. This moreover is not to be factious or a traitor towards your supreme ruler, but rather to be a most faithful keeper of your oath towards those whose direction you have undertaken, against perjury and against the oppressor of a kingdom whose protector he should have been. 2ff7e9595c
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